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RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Validity of Agreement of One Trust Company to
Indemnify Another for Assuming Liabilities of Insolvent Bank-Plaintiff
trust company sued on a contract whereby defendant and other local banks and
trust companies, fearing a bank panic, had agreed to repay to the plaintiff any
losses sustained by it as a result of assuming and securing the liabilities of an
insolvent bank. Plaintiff did incur a heavy loss, but defendant refused to pay
its share of indemnification, contending that it lacked the power to enter into
such an agreement, although a New Jersey statute provided that trust companies
should have all powers "necessary" to carry on a banking business.' Held, that
a motion to strike out the complaint should be denied, because the agreement was
within the defendant's "necessary" corporate powers. Trust Co. of New Jersey
v. Jefferson Trust Co., 186 Atl. 732 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1936).
Cases which have arisen under a federal statute 2 similar to that of New
Jersey have formulated the general rule that it is not within a bank's "necessary"
powers to guarantee, without benefit to itself, a debt in which it has no interest, s
but that a guaranty for the bank's own benefit is within its power.4 In applying
this principle, the courts, before holding that a bank has bound itself, have tacitly
required that there be a reasonable relationship between the actual or the probable
gain to the bank under the guaranty and the extent of the bank's liability.5 And
here, too, the court, relying largely on dicta in the widely publicized case of
O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co.,8 and ignoring two contrary decisions involving
closely related situations in other jurisdictions,7 appears to have been motivated
by the "benefit" doctrine, since the defendant's depositors and shareholders did
receive a reasonable benefit from the guaranty. Usually the insolvency of one
x. "Any trust company . . . in addition to the powers heretofore granted . . . shall
have all such powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking...." N. J.
ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 22i-6a.
2. "It (a national bank) shall have power . . . Seventh. To exercise by its board of
directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking. . . ." 13 STAT. i0i (1864), amended,
42 STAT. 767 (1922), 12 U. S. C. A. §24 (1927).
3. Citizens' Bank v. Clements, 172 Ark. 1023, 291 S. W. 439 (1927).
4. Nakdimen v. First Nat. Bank, 177 Ark. 3o3, 6 S. W. (2d) 505 (1928), cert. denied,
278 U. S. 635 (1928) ; Southern Exchange Bank v. First Nat Bank, 37 Ga. App. 612, 141
S. E. 323 (1928) ; 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 2592.
5. See Nakdimen v. First Nat. Bank, 177 Ark. 303, 325, 6 S. W. (2d) 505, 513 (3928),
cert. denied, 278 U. S. 635 (1928), in which the benefit to be derived from avoiding a financial
crisis through a guaranty was contrasted with the small cost of that guaranty; Board of
Comm'rs v. Citizens' T. & Say. Bank, 73 Ind. App. 76, 84, 123 N. E. 130, 132 (3919), in
which the court commented that, since the amount of deficiency had not been shown, enforce-
ment of the agreement might require the entire surplus of the guaranteeing bank; O'Connor
v. Bankers Trust Co., 289 N. Y. Supp. 252, 271, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Note (1935) 83 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 479, 485.
6. 289 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct. 3936), 5o HARV. L. Rav. 130, wherein the New York
Clearing House Association purported to act for its member banks in guaranteeing the de-
posits of the Harriman Bank & Trust Co., one of its members. After failure of that bank,
suit was brought against the other member banks for their pro rata share of the amount neces-
sary to pay depositors. Some of the banks made a settlement. The remainder were held not
liable, since the Association lacked authority to bind its members to such an agreement, but
the court did state that the agreement was not beyond the power of the individual banks if
they had entered into it themselves. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1933, p. I, col. 8; p. IO, col.
3; June 30, 3936, p. 1, col. I.
7. Board of Comm'rs v. Citizens' T. & Say. Bank, 73 Ind. App. 76, 123 N. E. 130 (919);
Norris v. Oklahoma State Bank, 159 Okla. 51, 34 P. (2d) 218 (932).
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bank results in withdrawals of deposits from other banks in the community, not
only for the purpose of hoarding because of apprehension, but also to assist
friends suffering losses in the insolvent institution," thus depleting reserves of
the institutions still open, and forcing them to make hasty liquidations at a loss.9
The guaranty here was reasonably certain to react to the advantage of the def end-
ant's depositors and shareholders by preventing such withdrawals, and by preserv-
ing, during the worst of the depression, the public confidence essential to the
survival of local banks.10 Therefore the defendant was properly held to have
had the power to subject itself to liability upon the indemnification contract.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Due Process-Validity of
State License Tax on Chain Stores Within the State Graduated According
to the Number of Stores Operated Everywhere-A Louisiana statute im-
posed on each store within the state a license tax graduated according to the
total number of stores operated under common ownership or control within or
without Louisiana.' Complainant, operator of a national chain of stores, sought
to restrain enforcement of the statute on the ground that it violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.2 Held,
the classification was not unreasonable or arbitrary, nor was the tax levied upon
complainant's property outside the state. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Grosfean, D. C. La., July, 1936.
It is well settled that a state may, to further its social or economic policies,
utilize its taxing power to promote or discourage certain kinds of business and
industry." Thus, prior to the enactment of the Louisiana statute, the feeling
that the chain store was inimical to local community welfare 4 expressed itself
in legislation designed primarily to strengthen the economic position of the inde-
pendent merchant by the imposition of burdens upon the chain store. The
favorite device employed was a license tax graduated according to the number of
stores operated under common ownership within the state. The United States
Supreme Court, in upholding such a tax, recognized that there were sufficient
differences in organization, management, and business methods between chain
stores and independent retailers to afford a proper basis for their separate classi-
fication and treatment; 5 and further, that the opportunities and powers of the
chain store became greater with the increase in the number of its units, so that
8. See Ostrolenk, Why the Banks Collapsed (May 1933) 38 CURRENT HISTORY 152, 156.
9. Under such a pressure of withdrawals, the banks, having a large percentage of frozen,
although not necessarily bad assets, might have been compelled to close their doors. See
NADLER AND BOGEN, THE BANKING CRISIS (933) 29-30; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFER-
ENCE BoARD, THE BANKING SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1932) 129.
IO. See WOODWARD AND RosE, A PRIMER OF MONEY (1932) 55-56.
I. La. Laws 1935, no. 5I.
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
3. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912); Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.
S. 40 (1934). But cf. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 (1928) ; Note
(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 120. Nor will the court, if any state of facts can reasonably be
conceived to sustain the classification, inquire into the motive prompting its adoption. State
Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 5o7 (1931) ; Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
supra.
4. It has been argued that the chain store provides no business for local banks, makes no
purchases from local sources, pays less wages than the independent enterpriser, and takes no
interest in local charities or civic affairs. Legis. (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 145, 151-152; see
Legis. (1931) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 239.
5. State Board of Tax Comm'rs of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931) ; Liggett v.
Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (933) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935).
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a graduated increase in the tax for the privilege of expanding the chain could
not be condemned as arbitrary. But, as has been suggested, 7 such a tax may
give to the national chain a competitive advantage over the local chain since,
theoretically, the former can spread the tax over all its units, both non-local and
local, and thereby reduce the burden on each local unit. Moreover, if, as
the Supreme Court has stated, the competitive advantages of the chain increase
with the number of its component links," such advantages would not cease to
accrue merely because state borders had been passed.9 Hence, it would appear
that the court, in the instant case, was justified in holding that the Louisiana stat-
ute did not effect an unreasonable or arbitrary classification.
A more serious question is whether the state had jurisdiction to levy a tax
graduated upon the number of stores both within and without the state. It is
undeniable that a direct tax by a state on property outside its territorial juris-
diction, 10 or a tax measured by such property," violates due process. But in the
instant case, the measure was limited to property within the state, only the rate
being affected by the existence of extraterritorial elements. It was for this reason
that the court concluded that no property outside the state was being taxed.
Although there is some precedent for such a holding in Maxwell v. Bugbee,"2
where the Supreme Court validated a state transfer tax in which the rate was
determined by the decedent's entire estate, both within and without the state, that
case may not be absolutely determinative of the question here. In the first place,
the Supreme Court itself has cast doubt on the Maxwell decision, pointing out
that it was decided by a split court."3 Secondly, the court, if it desired to, would
not find it difficult to distinguish between the tax in the Maxwell case and that
in the instant case.'4 Thirdly, although a form of words can be found to sus-
tain the tax, there can be no denial of the fact that the amount of taxes to be
paid under the Louisiana statute is affected by the existence of property outside
the state.' 5 Fourthly, it is apparent that in questions involving equal protection
or due process the Supreme Court is motivated as much by its conception of the
desirability of the legislation and by so-called "considerations of policy," '6 as
it is by legal principles. The Court cannot very well disregard the fact that if the
Louisiana tax is extensively adopted it may doom the national chain,'7 although
6. See Fox. v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 100 (935).
7. See Note (935) 44 YALE L. J. 61g, 624.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See supra note 7, at 626.
io. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, i99 U. S. 194 (i9o5).
ii. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; Powell, Due Process Tests of State
Taxation (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 423; cf. New York Central R. R. v. Miller, 2o2 U. S.
584 (i9o6) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
12. 250 U. S. 525 (1919).
13. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 495 (925).
14. In the first place, the Maxwell case involved a transfer tax, while the instant case in-
volves a license tax. Secondly, the formulae utilized by the two statutes are not exactly
alike. Thirdly, the Louisiana statute, because of the high rates imposed on the upper brack-
ets, tends to discriminate against the national chain (see infra note 17) while the tax in the
Maxwell case did not discriminate against an owner of property in several states. See Lown-
des, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax-Aftermath of Maxwell v. Bugbee (0936) 49
HARv. L. REv. 756, 777, 781, 782.
15. For example, if chain A and chain B each owns ioi stores in Louisiana but chain B
also owns 400 stores outside the state, chain A pays a tax of $50 while chain B pays a tax of
$55o on each of its stores in Louisiana.
16. ". . . one cannot escape the fact that due process and equal protection are merely
oblique verbalizations of the social, economic and political prejudices of the judiciary."
Lowndes, supra note 14, at 781; see also Powell, Extraterritorial Inheritance Taxation
(1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 283, 290, 291.
17. Since the maximum fee of $550 will reach only the national chain, it may well make
its operation prohibitive.
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past judicial expression would make it appear that the Court is not so averse to
such legislation as to invalidate it."' However, should the legislative purpose
meet with the Court's disfavor, Maxwell v. Bugbee may possibly be disregarded
and the extraterritoriality of the tax invoked as a ground to defeat it.
Constitutional Law-Twenty-first Amendment-Webb-Kenyon Act-
Validity of State License Upon Carriers of Liquor in Interstate Commerce-
Liquor was shipped by truck from Kentucky consigned to Baltimore. In Pitts-
burgh, it was transshipped to another truck which, contrary to the provisions of
a Pennsylvania statute,' had no Pennsylvania license. That state seized and
condemned the liquor, for the release of which this petition was brought. Held,
that the petition should be dismissed, as the transportation was a sufficient "use"
under the Twenty-first Amendment 2 and the Webb-Kenyon Act 3 to bring the
liquor within the police power of the state. Commonwealth v. One Dodge Mo-
tortruck, 187 Atl. 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
The purpose behind the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon
Act seems to have been to grant to dry states the power to control shipments
over their borders of liquor intended for ultimate consumption by their residents.
4
Hence, as the transportation through one state to a destination in another does
not appear to be the sort of transaction over which the former state was given
authority, the liquor might be regarded as a commodity in interstate commerce,
and thus immune from state regulation.5 Furthermore, taxes such as that levied
here might be enacted by several states, which would probably result in consid-
erable confusion and a practical prohibition upon shipments through dry states.
However, although the case for unconstitutionality is indeed a strong one, this
decision was proper. In the first place, the word "use" is easily susceptible of
a construction which would include transportation. Therefore, the court is to be
commended for sustaining the license law by following a course which has be-
come rare today, namely, giving to legislation the benefit of the doubt in cases
in which interpretations of the Constitution invalidating the statute, while per-
haps sounder, were certainly not the only reasonable ones. And some additional
basis may be found for this holding in those cases which have upheld statutes
requiring licenses of interstate carriers, on the grounds that such regulations were
necessary for the maintenance of highways and for their safe use.6 On the other
I8. Cardozo, J.: "A chain . . . is a distinctive business species, with its own capaci-
ties and functions. Broadly speaking its opportunities and powers become greater with the
number of the component links; and the greater they become, the more far-reaching are the
consequences, both social and economic. For that reason the state may tax the large chains
more heavily than the small ones, and upon a graduated basis, . . . it may make the tax so
heavy as to discourage multiplication of the units to an extent believed to be inordinate, and
by the incidence of the burden develop other forms of industry." Fox v. Standard Oil Co.,
294 U. S. 87, 100 (1935). For an excellent analysis of the economic and legal problems
raised by the Louisiana statute, see Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 61g.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 47, § 123.
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. XXI, § 2, "The transportation or importation into any State,
• . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited."
3. 37 STAT. 699 (913), 27 U. S. C. A. § 122 (1927), re-enacted, 49 STAT. 877, 27 U. S.
C. A. § 122 (Supp. 1935).
4. See 76 CONG. REc. 10, 18-20, 2199, 4141, 4170 (1933).
5. United States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373 (1919) ; Durst v. United States, 266 Fed. 65
(C. C. A. 4th, 1920) ; Haumschilt v. State, 142 Tenn. 520, 221 S. W. 196 (1920) ; Martin v.
Commonwealth, 126 Va. 715, IOO S. E. 836 (1919) ; 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIoNs
(8th ed. 1927) 1252.
6. Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554 (1927) ; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o (1915).
222.
RECENT CASES
hand, of course, a court might well conclude that the instant act was an undue
burden upon interstate commerce similar to unconstitutional statutes providing
for the compulsory bonding of carriers.
7
Insurance-Garnishment of Insurer's Liability Under Indemnity Policy
Containing "No Action" Clause-A policy provided that the insurer was "to
indemnify . . . the assured . . . against loss from liability imposed by law upon
him for damages on account of bodily injuries . . . sustained . . . by employees
of the assured," and contained a standard "no action" clause,' allowing suit only
by the insured and only for an actual money loss. An employee obtained a judg-
ment for personal injuries against the insolvent contractor, but brought garnish-
ment proceedings against the insurance company for the amount of the policy.
Held, that the "liability" of the insurer was subject to garnishment by the
employee even before the employer had actually sustained a money loss, because
this "best conforms to the intent of the parties . . . ,affords the greatest protec-
tion to the insured, and deprives the insurance company of no legitimate protec-
tion." Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Hancock, 169 So. 617 (Fla. 1936).
This court retained its place with the few jurisdictions allowing garnishment
on an indemnity policy containing a "no action" clause, 2 by deliberately nullifying
that clause, for it is fundamental in garnishment proceedings that the plaintiff
acquires no greater rights against the garnishee than the defendant had,3 and
here the defendant clearly had no right of action against the garnishee before
payment of the judgment.4  Therefore, the majority of courts 5 have been
impelled to give to the language of the "no action" clause the effect that the
insurance companies intended,6 since the language is so unambiguous that it may
be construed as it was in the present case only by a patent disregard for its plain
meaning. Nevertheless, even in these states, dissenting opinions 7 have supported
the minority view, urging that it would be unjust to allow the company to avoid
liability by "gambling" on the solvency of the insured. Of course, there is an
element of validity in this contention, and indeed, it does promote the fundamental
7. Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14 (1914) ; Liberty Hwy. Co. v. Michi-
gan Public Utilities Comm., 294 Fed. 703 (E. D. Mich. 1923).
,. "No action shall lie against the company to recover for loss under this policy, unless
it shall be brought by the assured for loss actually sustained and paid in money by him after
actual trial of the issue. . . ." Instant case at 61g.
2. Elliott v. Belt Automobile Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, 100 So. 797 (1924) ; Patterson v. Adan,
r19 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281 (1912) ; Sanders v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass
Ins. Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655 (1904). See Notes (1925) 37 A. L. R. 637, (1933) 83 A.
L. R. 677, 688.
3. International Harvester Co. v. Hanson, 36 N. D. 78, 161 N. W. 6o8 (1917) ; LaBarre
v. Doney, 53 Pa. Super. 435 (1913).
4. Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o6) ; Carter v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 76 Kan. 275, 91 Pac. 178 (1907).
5. Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o6) ; Bain v. Atkins, i81
Mass. 24o, 63 N. E. 414 (1902) ; Griffin v. Casualty & Surety Co., 231 Mich. 642, 204 N. W.
727 (1925); Glatz v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Co., 175 Wis. 42, 183 N. W. 683
-(1921). See Notes (1925) 37 A. L. R. 637, (1933) 83 A. L. R. 677, 688.
6. See Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity (1931) 8o U. oF PA. L. REv. i89,
202: "From the standpoint of the immunity of the insurer, one of the most perfect of these
clauses reads: 'No action shall lie against the company to recover for any loss or expense
under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured for loss or expense actually sus-
tained and paid in money by him after trial of the issue."'
7. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 31, 173 S. W. 307, 315 (1915);
Glatz v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Co., 175 Wis. 42, 48, 183 N. W. 683, 685 (1921).
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purposes of this type of insurance, namely, to protect the insured and to compen-
sate the injured employee." However, in the absence of legislation requiring
the result here, it seems to be too gross a departure from the expressed intent of
the contracting parties.
Labor Law-Anti-Injunction Act-Existence of "Labor Dispute"
Between Labor Union and Employer-Plaintiff company's employees, by a
unanimous vote on a secret ballot, according to the stipulated facts, decided not
to join the defendant union. Their employer consequently refused to recognize
the union as a bargaining representative or to discharge any employees unwilling
to become union members. To obtain these ends, the union picketed the plaintiff,
which brought this bill to enjoin the picketing. A Wisconsin statute forbade the
issuance of injunctions in a "labor distpute", which was defined to include, "any
controversy . . . concerning the association or representation of persons . . . to
arrange terms . . . of employment . . . regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." ' Held
(three justices dissenting), that the injunction should not issue, since a "labor
dispute" existed, although no employees were union members and there was no
dissatisfaction with working conditions. American Furniture Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 268 N. W. 250 (Wis. 1936).
This court followed what has been suggested in previous issues of -the
REVIEW,2 which fully discussed this problem, as a more correct and more salutary
interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 and similar state statutes, such as
that in the instant case, than the interpretation embodied in decisions which
have held that there were no "labor disputes" in situations analogous to this one.4
Labor Law-Interpretation of "Majority of Craft or Class" in Elections
Under the Railway Labor Act-In an election conducted by the National
Mediation Board under the provisions of the Federal Railway Labor Act,' a
majority of the employees in a particular craft participated, and 73 per cent. of
the votes were cast for the complainant labor union, but this did not consti-
tute a majority of all those eligible to vote. Nevertheless, the complainant was
certified by the Board as the employees' representative for collective bargaining.
Held, that the defendant railway should be compelled to recognize and deal with
8. "Those who procure this kind of insurance have not only their own protection in
mind, but also the idea that, if through their involuntary negligence a servant or other person
sustains injury, such an one may be recompensated." Patterson v. Adan, 19 Minn. 308, 312,
138 N. W. 281, 283 (1912); Glatz v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Co., I75 Wis. 42,
5I, 183 N. W. 683, 686 (1921).
i. Wis. Laws 1931, pp. 584, 591.
2. Note (936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 771; (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1027.
3. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1934).
4. E. g., Lauf v. E. G. Shriner & Co., 82 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935). There also have
been decisions in accord with that in the instant case. See, among others, Cinderella Theatre
Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers Local Union, etc., 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich. 1934) ; Miller Parlor
Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers Ind. Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J. I934).
1. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), amended, 48 STAT. I85 (934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et seq.
(Supp. 1935).
RECENT CASES
the complainant for purposes of collective bargaining,2 since the Act was con-
stitutional,8 and the complainant had been selected by a "majority" of the craft
within the meaning of the Act 4  Virginia Ry. v. System Fed. NO. 4o, Ry. Em-
ployees Dept. of the A. F. of L., 84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), cert.
granted, 4 U. S. L. WEEK 123 (U. S. Sup. Ct.).
The court's conclusion that a majority of those voting, even if they are not
a majority of those eligible to vote, may constitute a "majority" of a craft is
of major importance, for it should apply with equal force to a similar provision
for majority rule in the National Labor Relations Act.5 Although there seems
to be no judicial precedent in labor cases dealing with this problem, 6 courts have
almost unanimously 7 applied the rule enunciated here to elections in political
units,8 beneficial associations,9 and corporations.10 And even stronger support
for the decision is found in a consideration of the purpose of the Act, which was
designed, in part, to promote ". . . prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
. . . ,, 11 If a majority of all those in a craft or class were required to agree
to the selection of a bargaining representative, a close election might be nullified
and the purpose of the act frustrated by coercing a few of the employees who
2. Defendant railway was also restrained from influencing or interfering with its em-
ployees in their selection of representatives for collective bargaining. That the Act is con-
stitutional insofar as it makes such conduct on the part of the employer- unlawful was decided
in Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (193o).
3. For discussions of the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.
452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (5) (Supp. 1935), in similarly requiring employees to recognize and
deal with the chosen representatives of their employees, see Mason, The Limits as to Effective
Federal Control of the Employer-Employee Relationship (1936) 84 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 277,
291-302; Chandler, The National Labor Relations Act (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 245, 249 et seq.;
Spencer, The National Labor Relations Act (Oct. 1935) 8 J. Bus. U. OF CH1. 64-76.
4. "The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who
shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purpose of this chapter." 48 STAT.
1187 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (4) (Supp. 1935).
There was no appeal from the lower court's holding that the election in one craft, in
which less than a majority of the employees had voted, was void. System Fed. No. 40, Ry.
Employees Dept. of the A. F. of L. v. Virginia Ry., ii F. Supp. 621 (E. D. Va. 1935).
5. 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (a) (Supp. 1935).
6. A recent case involving only the matter of elections, and citing the instant case,
adopted this principle. Association of Clerical Employees of A. T. & S. F. Ry. System v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 85 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). So also Railway
Employees Dept. of the A. F. of L. v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., M. D. Tenn., June 16, 1936,
P. H. Labor & Unemp. Ins. Service ff 18,165, citing the principal case in the district court.
System Fed. No. 40, Ry. Employees Dept. of the A. F. of L. v. Virginia Ry., ii F. Supp. 621
(E. D. Va. 1935).
The National Labor Relations Board, administering NIRA, 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15
U. S. C. A. § 701 (Supp. 1935), which contained no reference to majorities, ruled as did the
instant court, but advanced no reasons. In re Denver Tramway Corp., N. L. R. B., Mar. 1,
1934, P. H. Labor & Unemp. Ins. Service 14,136. But the National Mediation Board had
formerly required that a representative receive a majority of all those eligible to vote, unless
the parties agree otherwise. RaP. NAT. MEDIATiON BD. (1935) 19.
7. The principle is, of course, not applied where constitutional or statutory provisions
provide otherwise. Wood v. Gordon, 58 W. Va. 321, 52 S. E. 261 (9o5) (statute expressly
required majority of all members elected to council) ; State ex rel. Eastland v. Gould, 31
Minn. 189, 17 N. W. 276 (1883) (constitution required majority of all members of legislature
to pass measure, so two-thirds of all legislators were required to override veto).
8. Missouri P. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276 (1919) (two-thirds only of those present in
each house of Congress, if a quorum, required to override veto) ; In re Todd, 193 N. E. 865
(Ind. I935). Contra: Chicago Rys. v. Commerce Comm., 336 Ill. 51, 167 N. E. 84o (1929).
9. Ladies of the Maccabees v. Commissioner of Ins., 235 Mich. 459, 2o9 N. W. 58r
(1926) (two-thirds of those present if a quorum).
Io. Commonwealth v. Vandegrift, 232 Pa. 53, 81 Atl. 153 (911) ; 5 FLETrCHa, COR-
PORATIONs (Perm. ed. 1931) § 2020.
Ir. 48 STAT. II87 (934), 45 U. S. C. A. § I51 (a) (Supp. 1935). (Italics added.)
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preferred the organization having a probable majority not to vote, which could
usually be accomplished more easily than compelling them to vote contrary to
their preference. However, the court's rule would render coercion not to vote
useless unless it was conducted on a large scale, which could be detected with
greater facility, and restrained under the provisions of the Act.12 The possibility
exists, it is true, that an election conducted in accordance with this construction
may not accurately expfess the will of the majority of all the employees, but the
probability is that those not voting have no preference, or have been induced not
to vote. Moreover, if any employees are so little concerned as not to vote, their
opinions are entitled to scant respect. And, finally, the rule of the lower court,
unquestioned on appeal,'" that unless a majority of those eligible to vote do so,
the election would be ineffective,14 would seem to set a fair minimum requirement
as to the number of employees who may select a representative for the entire craft.
Legislatures--Immunity of Federal Governmental Agency from State
Senate Investigation-In accordance with a resolution of the Pennsylvania
Senate,1 a committee was formed to investigate the Federal Works Progress
Administration in the state, for the alleged purpose of determining whether more
efficient administration might not remove most of the employables from the state
relief rolls, and thus lessen the relief burden upon Pennsylvania's taxpayers.
Several W. P. A. officials were subpoenaed by the committee but refused to
appear. Shortly afterwards, the United States instituted this suit to enjoin any
further continuance of the investigation. Held, 'that the injunction should be
granted, because the investigation was an invasion of the sovereignty of the
Federal Government. United States v. Owlett, I5 F. Supp. 736 (M. D. Pa.
1936), appeal filed, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 8, p. i, col. i (C. C. A. 3d,
1936).
In accordance with the established doctrine of federal immunity from state
interference, 2 it has been held that state courts could not compel federal officers
to appear as witnesses nor to produce official papers as evidence," and there would
seem to be little reason for not imposing a like disability upon investigating com-
mittees, unless the legislative branch of government is to be preferred over the
judicial. But there is an even more vital problem here, namely whether a branch
of the Federal Government should be subject to any investigation by such .a
committee. The power of legislatures to conduct investigations of this sort exists
solely for the purpose of aiding legislation, 4 and it is well settled that federal
agencies are not subject to state legislation, 5 although, of course, cases might arise
in which the contemplated legislation had some bearing on federal agencies and
12. 48 STAT. 1187 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3) (Supp. 1935).
13. Instant case at 652.
14. See supra note 4.
i. 19 PA. LEGIS. J. 171 (1936).
2. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1871); In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372 (1890) ; Utah
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389 (1917) ; see Tennessee v. Davis, ioo U. S.
257, 262-263 (1879).
3. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (19oo); In re Weeks, 82 Fed. 729 (D. C. Vt.
1897) ; see 25 Ors. ATf'y GEN. (195o) 326.
4. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1o3 U. S. 168 (1881); Commonwealth v. Costello, 21 Pa.
Dist. 232 (1912) ; Note (192o) 9 A. L. R. 1341.
5. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899) ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920);
Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928).
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yet was within the power of the legislature.6 However, in the light of the
wording of the resolution,7 such was not the case here, since the findings of the
committee could in no way have aided the legislature in its attempt to lighten
the state relief burden by a more efficient administration of W. P. A. Never-
theless, the court might well have held that the possibility that the findings would
influence future legislative policy with regard to state contributions to the federal
agency provided sufficient grounds for the investigation. Such a result would
have been especially desirable in view of the considerable value of legislative
investigations in bringing important facts to light,8 and the extreme unlikelihood
of any inquiry into the functioning of W. P. A. by a Democratic Congress.
However, it must be admitted that there was a somewhat too obvious political
aspect to the attempted investigation, 9 so that the report of the committee might
not have been entirely disinterested, and also a danger that it might be incomplete
because of the inability to subpoena federal officers. But regardless of expediency,
there appears to have been no sufficient ground in equity for enjoining the entire
continuance of the investigation by methods other than the examination of offi-
cers, 10 since the mere fact that the committee was without legal power did not
justify the granting of an injunction when no injury to the plaintiff was proved
beyond a rather theoretical "invasion" of its "sovereign power".
Torts-Mental Anguish Caused by Invasion of Interest in Witnessing
Interment of Body as Basis of Recovery-The defendant undertook to inter
the body of plaintiffs' father in their presence, but buried the body in the absence
of the plaintiffs, who brought actions in tort to recover for the mental pain and
suffering. Held, that plaintiffs had a right to witness the interment, to have
certain knowledge of the last resting place, and to the solace of the last leave-
taking, which rights were "implicit" in the "quasi right in property" in the dead
body and in the domestic relationship; and that since the invasion of such rights
was found to be "wanton" and "callous", plaintiffs could recover for their emo-
tional distress. Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 Atl. 585 (Sup. Ct.
N. J. 1936).
The concept of rights with regard to dead bodies and their disposition has,
of course, expanded since the early common law view that dead bodies were nul-
lius in bonis.1 Founded either upon the duty imposed by the criminal law to dis-
pose of a corpse so as not to create a nuisance,2 or an alleged right of the deceased
to be buried,8 a right in certain persons to the custody and disposition of the body
6. E. g., the voluntary contribution by the state of funds or materials in aid of the work
of a federal agency.
7. i9 PA. LEGIS. J. 171 (1936).
8. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1928) 422.
9. See Phila. Record and Phila. Inquirer, May i9 to June 3, 1936, passim.
Io. The restraint placed upon the subpcenaing of federal officers may be supported upon
the ground that the interference with their duties which would otherwise have resulted would
cause irreparable damage to the United States, which the ordinary procedure by way of
habeas corpus [Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (igoo)] would have been inadequate to
remedy because of the multiplicity of suits. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (i895).
I. Lord Coke, 3 INST. 203; (i930) 64 U. S. L. Ray. 5o5.
2. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 149 S. W. 871 (1912) ; Kanavan's Case, I Me.
226 (1821).
3. Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (917) ; Pettigrew v.
Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 Atl. 878 (19o4) ; Carey, The Disposition of the Body After Death
(1855) 19 Am. L. REV. 251.
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has come to be recognized.4 Although there is language to the effect that this is a
property right, in the general sense,5 most courts vaguely define it as a "quasi right
in property", 6 and, some add as a qualification, that such right is held as a "sacred
trust" for those who have an interest in the body.7 With this ambiguous property
right as a basis, courts have held that there is a corresponding duty not to inter-
fere with the disposition of the body, and that mutilation, exposure, or detention
thereof, is actionable." Starting with the above mentioned "duties" and "rights",
some courts, through a process of logical legerdemain, have constructed a right
to the solace and comfort of the burial rite." Still others have succeeded in reach-
ing the result they desired by creating tort liability out of bailment and contractual
obligations,10 and even out of an alleged interference with the enjoyment of the
"title" of the deceased and his heirs to the particular lot in the cemetery.:1 It is
to be noted, however, that in most of these cases there was some accompanying
physical damage to the corpse, and hence an invasion of the alleged "quasi right
in property". 12  Only a few courts have preferred to place the source of the
asserted right to witness the interment primarily in affection, religious sentiment,
and social approbation.'3 The court in the instant case, although seeking to limit
the nature of the recovery to tort liability, was obviously influenced by the ex-
press undertaking by the defendant to inter the body in the presence of the plain-
tiffs.' 4 Moreover, the grounds avowed as the source of the right to witness the
burial seem to be of doubtful validity. Thus, little can be said in favor of the
view that such is a "right" incident to the common law "duty" to bury. How-
ever, the express mention by this court of the other source of the right, namely
the domestic relationship, marks a further destruction of the demarcation between
merely morally reprehensible conduct and orthodox legally protected interests.
But since there was no physical damage to the corpse here, it is regrettable that
4. Lott v. Graves, 67 Ala. 40 (188o) ; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 5o N. W. 238
(189i) ; In re Beekman Street, 4 Bradf. 503 (N. Y. 1857) ; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 404.
5. Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 138 (1858) ; England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co.,
86 W. Va. 575, 104 S. E. 46 (I92O) ; (I911) 24 HA~v. L. REv. 315; cf. Keyes v. Konkel, ii
Mich. 550, 78 N. W. 649 (i899) ; Guthrie v. Weaver, i Mo. App. 136 (1876).
6. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S. E. 24 (19o5) ; Gostkowski v.
Roman Catholic Church, 262 N. Y. 320, 186 N. E. 798 (I933); Pierce v. Swan Point Ceme-
tery Co., 10 R. I. 227 (1872).
7. Cohen v. Congregation Shearith Israel, 85 App. Div. 65, 82 N. Y. Supp. 918 (19o3);
Jones, The Law of Dead Bodies (1927) 2 ALA. L. J. 218.
8. Beam v. Cleveland & St. L. Ry., 97 Ill. App. 24 (igoi) ; Bonaparte v. Fraternal
Funeral Home, 2o6 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (i934) ; Nichols v. Central Vt. Ry., 94 Vt. 14,
lO9 Atl. 905 (i919) ; Note (1933) 19 CORN. L. Q. io8. Accord: Kneass v. Cremation So-
ciety, 1O3 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1919), 28 YALE L. J. 508.
9. Jefferson County Burial Society v. Scott, 226 Ala. 556, 147 So. 634 (933) ; Finley v.
Atlantic Transport Co., 22o N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (917) ; (1915) 15 COL. L. REy. 628;
see Awtrey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 121 Va. 284, 286, 93 S. E. 570, 57, (1917).
io. Guyer v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 S. W. (2d) 666 (Ark. 1936) ; Renihan v. Wright,
125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822 (18go) ; Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 Pac. 172 (907);
cf. Deavors v. Southern Express Co., 2oo Ala. 372, 76 So. 288 (917).
ii. Wright v. Hollywood Cemetery Corp., 112 Ga. 884, 38 S. E. 94 (I9OI) ; Meagher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868) ; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411 (1899) ; cf. Jacobus v. Congre-
gation of the Children of Israel, IO7 Ga. 518, 33 S. E. 853 (1899).
12. Cf. Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 44, 184 S. E. 781 (1936) ; Douglas v. Stokes, 149
Ky. 5o6, 149 S. W. 849 (I912).
13. O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 55 Pac. 9o6 (899) ; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis.
453, 1O2 N. W. 40 (19o5) ; Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead (1905) 17
GREEN BAG 345; cf. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 149 S. W. 871 (1912).
14. See instant case at 586.
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the court did not take a clearer stand on the assertion and definition of such a
right-the existence of which appears to be desired by all courts-by assigning
solely its true basis, the sentiment attached to the relational interest.15
Trusts-Bank's Debiting of One Account and Crediting of Another
Creates a Res Which May Be the Subject of a Trust-Petitioner, American
Express Company, contracted to deliver to a bank travellers' cheques for the
purpose of sale. The bank was to act as agent for the petitioner, and to hold
the cheques and the proceeds thereof in trust for the petitioner and to make
remittance daily. On the day that the bank was closed, it had sold several
cheques to its depositors and had received in payment checks drawn on itself.
The bank had debited the drawers' accounts and had credited the petitioner's
account with the amounts of the checks. The petitioner sought to have a prefer-
ence declared in its favor for the amount so received by the bank from the sale
of cheques. Held, that the debiting and crediting procedure augmented the assets
of the bank, thus permitting the petitioner to obtain a preference. Squire v.
American Express Co., 2 N. E. (2d) 766 (Ohio 1936).
Although the debiting of one account and the crediting of another with an
equal sum does not increase the assets of a bank,' many courts have overcome
this obstacle to the establishment of a trust by the fiction that the shifting of
credits has the same effect as drawing out money in actual cash and then rede-
positing it.2 However, the federal courts 3 and a few state courts I have refused
to apply this rule, on the ground that to do so would give a preference to one who
actually had contributed nothing to the funds coming into the receiver's hands.
But although the decision here was consistent with precedent,5 the reasoning
employed in reaching it was illogical, for the court considered the problem created
by the bookkeeping transaction as being related only to tracing the trust fund,
whereas it pertained to the much more fundamental question of discovering a
specific res upon which to base the trust.6 It would seem, however, that the
result of this case, regardless of its judicial apology, would still be unsound, for
I5. See Green, Relational Interests (1936) 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 485.
i. "The check represents merely a diminution of the total of the bank's liabilities to the
extent of the amount for which the check is drawn. For the purposes of establishing a trust
and decreeing a lien on specific property, a decrease of liabilities is not an increase of assets."
Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 Yale L. 3. 98o, OO3.
2. Myers v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, ioi Fla. 407, 134 So. 6oo (93) ; Andrew
v. Helmer & Gortner State Bank, 217 Iowa 232, 251 N. W. 86o (1933) ; Winkler v. Veigel,
176 Minn. '384, 223 N. W. 622 (1929). Cf. State v. McKinley County Bank, 32 N. M. 147,
252 Pac. 98o (1927). See Poweshiek County v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 209 Iowa 467, 228
N. W. 32 (1929), for an argument against this theory on the ground that there is no reason
to expect that if the depositor had demanded cash, the bank, on the verge of insolvency, would
have paid it.
3. O'Neal v. White, 79 F. (2d) 835 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Mechanics & Metals Nat.
Bank v. Buchanan, 12 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v.
Clayton, 56 Fed. 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893) ; cf. Miami v. First Nat. Bank, 58 F. (2d) 561 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1932).
4. Freiberg v. Stoddard, 161 Pa. 259, 28 At. 1II (1894) ; Hornick More & Porterfield
v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 56 S. D. 18, 227 N. W. 375 (1929).
5. Fulton v. Escanaba Paper Co., 129 Ohio St. 90, 193 N. E. 758 (934).
6. See O'Neal v. White, 79 F. (2d) 835, 836 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). ". . . no fund in
cash was in fact set aside, and there was thus no fund in the possession of the bank as to
which a trust could be predicated." Also see, State v. Platte Valley State Bank of Scotts-
bluff, i3o Neb. 222, 264 N. W. 421 (1936) ; Winkler v. Veigel, 176 Minn. 384, 223 N. W. 622
(X929) ;.4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 922; (1928) I3 IOWA L. REv. 479.
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the reduction of the fund available to the depositors of a defunct bank by the
creation of preferences, undesirable at best, is even more unwarranted when
founded upon an obvious fiction.
Workmen's Compensation Acts-Juror as Employee Within Meaning
of Compensation Act-While serving as a juror, the plaintiff contracted
pneumonia as a result of being lodged, without covering, in jail over night. He
brought suit under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, which defined
"employee" to include " . . . every person in the service of the State or of any
county . . . under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied,
except an elective official ... ." 1 Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, on
the ground that he was not an employee within the meaning of the statute.
Board of Comnz-'rs of Eagle County v. Evans, 6o P. (2d) 225 (Colo. 1936).
The reason assigned by the court for its holding was that a juror's duty to
serve arises out of a status imposed by law rather than by contract, thus differen-
tiating him from ordinary state employees or appointees,2 who were intended
to be benefited by the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 However, there is noth-
ing in the wording of the statute which draws this distinction, either expressly or
by implication. And, in Industrial Contm. of Ohio v. Rogers,4 the only other
case which appears to have dealt with this point,, such a distinction was not made.
This court, however, declined to follow that case, possibly because the opinion
was written without any citation of authority. Furthermore, in a number of
cases arising under other statutes also identical in their definition of public em-
ployees with that here involved, recovery has been permitted although persons
serving the state or counlty did so under a statutory duty, 6 as in the case of a
citizen required to aid a forest warden in fighting fire 7 or compelled to aid a
sheriff in the capture of a criminal.8  Indeed, authority in other states is almost
unanimously contrary to the basis of the holding in the instant case if reasonable
analogy is resorted to. Moreover, even were precedent disregarded this decision
would seem unsound, for Workmen's Compensation Acts should be given a
liberal construction in order to accomplish the evident purpose of the legisla-
tures,9 which was to throw the burden of loss from injury in the line of duty
i. Colo. Laws 1919, c. 21o, § 9 (a), amended, Colo. Laws 1931, c. 175, § I.
2. See Stene, Application of State Workmen's Compensation Laws to Public Employees
and Officers (932) 17 MINN. L. Ray. 162, 172.
3. The eases cited by the court as authority for this conclusion arose out of very different
circumstances from those in the instant case. Thus two, The Queen v. Lui Self, 8 Hawaii
434 (1892) and People v. Hopt, 3 Utah 396, 4 Pac. 25o (1884), held that certain classes of
persons could serve as jurors without violating statutes prohibiting their appointment to civil
office. The other eases involved not jurors, but a policeman, an appraiser in replevin, a relief
worker, a convict doing road work, and a person doing road work under penalty of a fine for
non-compliance.
4. 122 Ohio St. 134, 171 N. E. 35 (293o) (exactly in point with the instant ease, except
that in the Ohio ease the juror had served beyond the period required by law, a factor which
the court purported to disregard in allowing recovery).
5. The scarcity of such eases is strange, since only one statute, that of Idaho, was found
to specifically exclude jurors. IDAHO CODE ANN. (2932) § 43-903.
6. Rector v. Cherry Valley Timber Co., 115 Wash. 31, 196 Pac. 653 (1921) ; West Salem
v. Industrial Comm., 162 Wis. 57, 155 N. W. 929 (1916).
7. Moore v. State, 2oo N. C. 300, 156 S. E. 8o6 (193o).
8. Monterey County v. Rader, 299 Cal. 221, 248 Pac. 912 (1926).
9. Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617 (1928);
cf. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm., 88 Colo. 573, 298 Pac. 955 (93).
RECENT CASES 231
on those who benefit from the service rendered and who are at the same time
better able to bear and distribute the burden.10 It would be clearly within this
well settled rule of construction, and would certainly promote the purpose of the
legislation to accord its benefits to a juror. Therefore, although the Colorado
court purported both to follow the holdings of other courts and to ascer-
tain the intent of the legislature, in reality it did neither. And so, although
the conclusion in the instant case may have had some basis in a doubt as to the
actual cause of the plaintiff's injury" or in the feeling that the plaintiff's employ-
ment was too casual to entitle him to recover,'2 it seems clear that the holding
was incorrect on the grounds given.
io. See Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 8o N. H. 194, 197, 115 Atl. 449, 452 (1921).
ii. See instant case at 226.
12. See Colo. Laws 1931, c. 175, § I (expressly excluding casual private employees).
There is a conflict as to whether "casual" refers to the nature of or the duration of the service.
Compare Millard County v. Industrial Comm., 62 Utah 46, 217 Pac. 974 (1923) with Con-
sumers Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm., 289 Ill. 423, 124 N. E. 6o8 (1919).
